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THE POST-ZELMAN VOUCHER 
BATTLEGROUND: WHERE TO TURN 
AFTER FEDERAL CHALLENGES TO 
BLAINE AMENDMENTS FAIL 
LUKE A. LANTTA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
School voucher proponents who think that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris1 was the definitive victory in the decades-old fight 
over indirect funding for nonpublic schools are gravely mistaken.  The U.S. 
Constitution’s Establishment Clause2 could prove to be a much smaller hurdle 
to the voucher movement than the clauses contained in most state constitutions.  
While these clauses vary, they are all more stringent than the Establishment 
Clause regarding public funding of nonpublic institutions.  Some of these 
clauses explicitly prohibit both direct and indirect aid to sectarian schools.3  
Other states, while not explicitly prohibiting indirect aid, suggest that indirect 
aid is prohibited.4  Still other states do not distinguish between sectarian and 
secular nonpublic schools; they instead prohibit public funding for any nonpub-
lic school.5  One state, Virgina, specifically allows funding only for nonsectarian 
nonpublic schools.6  Finally, one state, Michigan, specifically prohibits vouch-
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 1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Cleveland voucher program because individuals chose where 
the voucher funds went and thus the funds flowed only indirectly to religious schools). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”). 
 3. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. VII (“No money shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of any sec-
tarian institution.”). 
 4. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7: 
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other 
public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys 
whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectarian purpose, or to 
help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university or other literary or 
scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatsoever; nor shall 
any grant or donation of land, money or other personal property, ever be made by the state, 
or any such public corporation to any church, or for any sectarian purpose. 
 5. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“[N]or shall public funds be appropriated for the support or 
benefit of any sectarian or private educational institution.”). 
 6. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10: 
No appropriation of public funds shall be made to any school or institution of learning not 
owned or exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision thereof; provided, 
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ers.7  These clauses are all commonly referred to as “Blaine amendments,”8 and 
they are the next targets in the war over vouchers. 
Recognizing the obstacles posed by state constitutions, voucher propo-
nents—such as the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty9 and the Institute for Jus-
tice—have filed or are planning to file suits in at least six states.10  Inspired by 
Zelman, voucher advocates seek to create enough conflicting opinions in district 
and circuit courts that the Supreme Court will be forced to confront the issue 
and strike down Blaine amendments across the states.11  These voucher advo-
cates believe that “[t]he Blaine Amendments are vulnerable to challenge under 
the Free Exercise Clause12 and the Equal Protection Clause,13 both because of 
 
first, that the General Assembly may, and the governing bodies of the several counties, cities 
and towns may, subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the General Assembly, ap-
propriate funds for educational purposes which may be expended in furtherance of elemen-
tary, secondary, collegiate or graduate education of Virginia students in public and nonsectar-
ian private schools and institutions of learning, in addition to those owned or exclusively 
controlled by the State or any such county, city or town; second, that the General Assembly 
may appropriate funds to an agency, or to a school or institution of learning owned or con-
trolled by an agency, created and established by two or more States under a joint agreement 
to which this State is a party for the purpose of providing educational facilities for the citizens 
of the several States joining in such agreement; third, that counties, cities, towns, and districts 
may make appropriations to nonsectarian schools of manual, industrial, or technical training, 
and also to any school or institution of learning owned or exclusively controlled by such 
county, city, town, or school district. 
 7. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2: 
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by 
the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to 
aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, 
or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition 
voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided, directly or in-
directly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any 
such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or 
in part to such nonpublic school students. 
 8. As will be made clearer after the brief historical review of the state Blaine amendments below, 
the name “Blaine amendment” is really a misnomer.  The “original” Blaine amendment was defeated 
in the U.S. Senate, and the provisions that resemble it in the various state constitutions vary signifi-
cantly in their terminology and in the eras in which they were passed.  The reason that they are collec-
tively referred to as “Blaine amendments” is that, though varying in their specific language, they all 
have the same intended effect the federal Blaine Amendment had—prohibition of public funds to sup-
port religious institutions.  Hence, the phrase “Blaine amendments” here will refer to all of these state 
amendments. 
 9. For an example of the Becket Fund’s activities, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002) (No. 68565-7) [hereinafter 
Becket Fund Brief]. 
 10. Mary Leonard, Proponents of Vouchers See Opening Planning Suits in Six States, Including 
Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2002, at A1 (claiming that voucher proponents have targeted Massa-
chusetts, Maine, and Vermont, and other states). 
 11. Id. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”) (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
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their discrimination against religious families and because of their sordid past.”14  
In focusing solely on federal challenges to the state constitutions, however, 
these advocates ignore the very real possibility of failure at the federal level.  
While advocates liken the significance of the Zelman decision to that of Brown 
v. Board of Education,15 they must remember that Brown has still not led to 
complete school desegregation16—the supposed intent of the decision.  To fulfill 
their goals, voucher advocates must travel down a long road, one that will likely 
not end with a single Supreme Court victory that strikes down Blaine amend-
ments.  If the pro-voucher camp’s efforts at the federal level turn out to be for 
naught, they will be forced to return to battle it out in the individual states, 
seeking victory by sculpting voucher programs that fit within existing state 
Blaine amendments—a potentially successful possibility. 
This Note will briefly review the history of Blaine amendments, how 
voucher advocates believe the history of these amendments will, in part, lead 
them to victory on federal grounds, and ultimately how this strategy will fail 
them.  Then this Note will examine how voucher programs could fit within the 
existing Blaine amendment structure in most states, leaving the remaining 
states—where a voucher program simply could not be interpreted to fit within a 
Blaine amendment framework—to be swayed by political processes.17 
II 
THE BIRTH OF BLAINE AMENDMENTS 
A. The “Original” Blaine Amendment 
Upon recognizing the overwhelming political value of, and public support 
for, President Ulysses S. Grant’s 1875 proposal to eliminate direct and indirect 
support for sectarian schools,18 Representative James G. Blaine introduced to 
 
 14. Eric W. Treene, The Grand Finale is Just the Beginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle 
Over Blaine Amendments 12, The Federalist Society White Papers, at http://fedsoc.org/pdf/FedSoc 
BlaineWP.html.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). 
 15. Avi Schick, Veni, Vidi, Vouchers, SLATE (Sept. 17, 2002), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2071085/ 
(noting that “President Bush characterized the decision as ‘just as historic’ as Brown”). 
 16. See, e.g., Edward Blum & Roger Clegg, Chilling Suits: Denying Fees Will Allow Segregation, 
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 29, 2001, at 6 (noting that more than 400 school districts are still 
under judicial desegregation supervision). 
 17. The political process, up to this point, has been largely unsuccessful, as evidenced by the failed 
voucher ballot proposals in California and Michigan in 2000. 
 18. In at least two particular instances Grant gave public support for the objectives embodied in 
Blaine’s amendment.  First, at a convention of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee meeting in 
Des Moines, Iowa, Grant delivered a speech in which he stated: 
Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar, appropriated for their support, shall 
be appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools.  Resolve that neither the State nor 
Nation, nor both combined shall support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to 
afford to every child growing up in the land the opportunity of a good common school educa-
tion, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas. 
Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 47 (1992) (quoting 
Ulysses S. Grant, Address at the Society of the Army of the Tennessee convention (Sept. 30, 1875), in 
THE INDEX, Oct. 28, 1875, at 513).  Grant echoed these sentiments in his annual message to Congress: 
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the House of Representatives an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that pro-
vided: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of 
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted 
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so 
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.19 
Though the amendment overwhelmingly passed the House by a vote of 180 to 
7,20 it failed to garner the two-thirds supermajority required in the Senate.21 
Two primary issues drove public and thus political, support for Blaine’s 
amendment.  The first issue was a concern over “public funding of sectarian 
education.”22  Once Catholics “comprised a majority or near-majority of the 
church-going population” in some northeastern cities, their “sectarian schools” 
started receiving indirect public funding.23  This, in turn, led to the call by Prot-
estants “for legislation prohibiting sectarian control over public schools and the 
diversion of public funds to religious institutions.”24  The second concern was 
the “issue of religious exercises in the public schools.”25  Catholics, largely un-
successful in securing direct or indirect funding, redirected their attention to 
challenging the Protestant doctrines promoted in the public schools—Bible 
reading and other Protestant religious practices.26  Exploiting these sentiments, 
Blaine hoped to catapult himself into the presidency. 
 
I suggest for your earnest consideration, and most earnestly recommend it, that a constitu-
tional amendment be submitted to the legislatures of the several States for ratification . . . for-
bidding the teaching in said schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan tenets; and prohibiting the 
granting of any school funds or taxes, or any part thereof, either by the legislative, municipal, 
or other authority, for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or de-
nomination, or in aid or for the benefit of any other object of any nature or kind whatever. 
Id. at 52 (quoting from Ulysses S. Grant, Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 7, 1875), in THE INDEX, 
Dec. 16, 1875, at 593).  Through these speeches, Grant was attempting to align the Republic Party with 
the Protestant cause.  Id. at 48. 
 19. H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875). 
 20. 4 CONG. REC. 5191 (1876). 
 21. The amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 28 to 16 but fell short of the supermajority by 
four votes.  4 CONG. REC. 5595 (1876).  Twenty-seven Senators were absent from the vote, most nota-
bly then-Senator James G. Blaine.  Green, supra note 18, at 67. 
 22. Green, supra note 18, at 42. 
 23. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 
28 (1981). 
 24. Green, supra note 18, at 43. 
 25. Id. at 42. 
 26. Id. at 44 (citing Vincent P. Lannie, Alienation in America: The Immigrant Catholic and Public 
Education in Pre-Civil War America, 32 REV. POL. 503 (1970)).  Again, like their efforts to seek fund-
ing for their schools, Catholics were largely unsuccessful in these pre-Civil War challenges.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 AM. L. REG. 417, 419 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859) (allowing corporal punish-
ment of a Catholic student who refused to recite the Ten Commandments from the King James Bible); 
Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854) (upholding a state statute under which a child was expelled 
from school for refusing to read from King James Bible); Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 (1876) (allowing 
expulsion of Catholic students who missed classes to attend services on a Catholic holy day of obliga-
tion).  For a more general discussion of Protestant control of education during this period, see Daniel J. 
Morrissey, The Separation of Church and State: An American-Catholic Perspective, 47 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1997). 
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Although there is much contention over the exact substance of the senti-
ments Blaine intended to exploit in his quest for the presidency, they indicated 
the rising nativism that was characteristic of the times.27  Nativism of this period 
could best be defined as anti-Catholic sentiment fueled by the ever-increasing 
number of Irish immigrants and their subsequent increase in political power in 
northern cities and states.28  Few disagree that anti-Catholic nativism character-
ized this period of history, for “[i]n America, anti-Catholicism is a cultural 
fact”29 as it “was rooted in English culture and was part of the cultural baggage 
of British America.”30  Whether Blaine himself was anti-Catholic is irrelevant to 
the discussion,31 for his use of the amendment was purely a political tool to gain 
the anti-Catholic vote.  Blaine knew that his amendment would be perceived as 
anti-Catholic and supportive of nativism.32  More importantly, the public per-
ceived, supported, and rallied around the amendment the way Blaine intended.33  
The Nation was quick to point out that 
Mr. Blaine did, indeed, bring forward the opening of Congress a Constitutional 
amendment directed against the Catholics, but the anti-Catholic excitement was, as 
every one knows now, a mere flurry; and all that Mr. Blaine means to do or can do 
with his amendment is, not to pass it but to use it in the campaign to catch anti-
Catholic votes.34 
Though the amendment’s time on the national stage may have been brief and 
Blaine’s personal attachment to it fleeting, the ideological bases—including 
anti-Catholicism—that fueled its appeal flourished on the state level and im-
 
 27. It was no secret that the Republican Party of the late 1800s catered to such anti-Catholic or-
ganizations as the American Protective Association.  In fact, its strength contributed to the elections of 
such politicians as William McKinley in his reelection as Ohio governor in 1893.  HIGHAM, supra note 
23, at 83-84. 
 28. Id. at 79.  For a more in-depth analysis of the roots of anti-Catholic animus in the United States 
see RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1-25 (1938). 
 29. Michael deHaven Newsom, The American Protestant Empire: A Historical Perspective, 40 
WASHBURN L.J. 187, 219 n.258 (2001). 
 30. George Dargo, Religious Toleration and Its Limits in Early America, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 341, 
354 (1996). 
 31. In fact, a review of Blaine’s personal history might suggest that he was personally indifferent to 
Catholicism.  Though Blaine’s paternal ancestors “identified with the Presbyterian church,” his mother 
was a “devoted Catholic.”  HENRY DAVENPORT NORTHROP, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF HON. 
JAMES G. BLAINE 21 (Philadelphia, H.J. Smith & Co. 1893).  Speaking of his mother’s religion, Blaine 
said that he would not “speak a disrespectful word of my mother’s religion, and no pressure will draw 
me into any avowal of hostility or unfriendliness to Catholics, though I have never received, and do not 
expect, any political support from them.”  Id.  The Kennebec Journal identified Blaine as the equiva-
lent of a Presbyterian.  Id. at 22.  Also, surprisingly, “Blaine did not take part in any of the debates sur-
rounding the amendment, even though he had ample opportunity to influence the measure in both 
chambers.” Green, supra note 18, at 54.  Once Blaine lost the presidential nomination he effectively 
abandoned the proposed amendment.  Id. 
 32. Green, supra note 18, at 51 n.84 (citing Steven K. Green, The National Reform Association and 
the Religious Amendments to the Constitution, 1864-1876 (1987) (unpublished master’s thesis, Univer-
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) (on file with the Library of the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill)). 
 33. In fact, after the first of President Grant’s speeches on the issue of school funding, “[t]he sole 
voice of protest came from the Catholic Church.”  Id. at 48. 
 34. Id. at 54 (quoting from The Nation, Mar. 16, 1876, at 173). 
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pressed its mark.  Today we can still see its remnants—including the ill-
motives—in a majority of the state constitutions.35 
B. The Fight Moves to the States 
New York became the first state to pass a state Blaine amendment36 when, in 
1894, it began prohibiting direct and indirect aid to sectarian schools.37  Within 
five years, “fourteen states had joined New York in passing measures prohibit-
ing the division of public school funds, often in the form of constitutional 
amendments.  By 1890, the number of states with constitutional prohibitions 
against the transfer of public funds would rise to twenty-nine.”38  Adoption of 
Blaine amendments, however, was not wholly left up to the states themselves. 
When Congress passed enabling legislation dividing the Dakotas into two 
states, it required them, as well as Montana and Washington, to incorporate 
language analogous to that of the Blaine amendment in their respective state 
constitutions as a precondition to admittance into the Union.39  This experience 
was typical for the western states.  New Mexico, Arizona, and Idaho were all 
required to adopt constitutional provisions prohibiting the use of public funds 
to support “sectarian” institutions as a prerequisite to statehood.40  These 
amendments, as well as those of all other states that contain similar language, 
can be conveniently divided into four general categories that each require dis-
 
 35. See, e.g., Green, supra note 18, at 38, 41-67, 69; Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of 
Separation & Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 50-53 (1997); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School 
Choice, the First Amendment, & State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 657, 659, 669-75 
(1998).  This is not to say, however, that anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant animus was the sole motivating 
factor in the passage of state Blaine amendments.  An analysis of all the factors that led to the passage 
of most of these amendments is beyond the scope of this Note.  The focus on anti-Catholicism here is 
for two reasons: (1) while anti-Catholicism was not the sole motivating factor, it was a primary motiva-
tion in the passage of these amendments, supra Part II.A; and (2) anti-Catholicism is the focal point for 
voucher proponents when they point to the state amendments’ nefarious histories, infra Part II.C. 
 36. More precisely, New York was the first in the post-federal Blaine Amendment era.  A number 
of states had pre-federal Blaine Amendment prohibitions on public funds supporting religious institu-
tions.  See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, amend. art. XVIII (1855), (superseded by MASS. CONST. amend. 
arts. XLVI, XCVI, CIII); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (adopted 1857); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 
(adopted 1851). 
 37. The amendment provided that: 
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit or any public 
money . . . directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance . . . of any school or institution of learn-
ing wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which 
any denomination tenet or doctrine is taught. 
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (as passed in 1894).  It should be noted, however, that New York did have a 
similar law in effect since 1844.  1844 N.Y. Laws, ch. 320, § 12. 
 38. Green, supra note 18, at 43 (citing WILLIAM BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 237-66 
(1890)). 
 39. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676.  See Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, 
Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Con-
stitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 458-69 (1988).  Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court 
does not consider the enabling acts’ requirements to adopt language markedly similar to the federal 
Blaine amendment to be Blaine amendments.  Locke v. Davey, No. 02-1315, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626, at 
*20 n.7 (Feb. 25, 2004). 
 40. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 26, 36 Stat. 557 (enabling act for New Mexico and Arizona); Act 
of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 8, 26 Stat. 215 (enabling act for Idaho). 
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tinctly different approaches for creating a voucher system.41  Before we can 
categorize the various amendments, however, we must first examine why cur-
rent voucher proponents think that the history of the federal Blaine Amend-
ment and subsequent state Blaine amendments renders all Blaine amendments 
unconstitutional. 
C. Why Voucher Advocates Argue State Amendments are Unconstitutional 
and Why These Challenges Might Fail 
Based on the history of the federal Blaine amendment, and not necessarily 
the history of the individual state constitutional provisions, voucher advocates 
have initiated a multi-headed approach to challenging state Blaine amend-
ments.  This strategy includes urging a narrow interpretation of the respective 
state Blaine amendments, amending state constitutions, and challenging the 
amendments based on the U.S. Constitution.42 
1. Narrow interpretation 
Even though advocates admit that the first strategy—encouraging a narrow 
interpretation of the respective state constitutional provisions—was successful 
in Ohio and Wisconsin and employed in Washington, little elaboration of this 
strategy is given in subsequent discussion, though admittedly it could be suc-
cessful “in states where the case law interpreting a state’s Blaine amendment 
has been mixed.”43  This strategy, likely to be the most fruitful, is all but ignored 
by voucher advocates—even outside  states where the case law interpreting a 
state’s Blaine amendment is mixed. 
2. Constitutional amendments 
Despite the defeat of the 2000 voucher ballot proposals in Michigan and 
California by greater than a margin of two to one,44 the Blaine amendment chal-
lengers contend that this was because the plans in those states were particularly 
complicated.45  Yet, every statewide ballot proposal attempting to amend a state 
constitution to permit vouchers has failed.  Although proponents contend that a 
“straightforward constitutional amendment to permit school choice would be 
much more likely to succeed,”46 they must recognize that such populist appeals 
are unlikely to succeed given the current socio-political climate regarding public 
 
 41. Discussion of the actual crafting and appropriate components of a voucher system that will 
withstand federal constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 42. TREENE, supra note 14, at 11-13. 
 43. Id. at 11. 
 44. Michigan’s Proposal 1 was defeated sixty-nine percent to thirty-one percent.  California’s 
Proposition 38 was defeated seventy-one percent to twenty-nine percent.  Darci McConnell, Educators 
Seek Voucher Backers’ Help, DET. NEWS, Nov. 15, 2000, at D1. 
 45. TREENE, supra note 14, at 11-12. 
 46. Id. at 12. 
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schools.47 even if the “nefarious history behind the Blaine Amendment” is high-
lighted in those states whose history is “nefarious.”48 
While the factors that drove the defeat of the most recent voucher proposals 
were numerous, two warrant special attention because neither was addressed by 
the voucher proponents’ arguments concerning why the Michigan and Califor-
nia proposals failed.  First, there is little doubt that part of the push to maintain 
“neighborhood schools” is motivated, at least in part, by the same forces that 
drove northern states to have some of the most segregated schools in the na-
tion.49  Second, the voucher opponents spent an estimated $6 million fighting 
Michigan’s Proposal 1 and an estimated $30 million fighting California’s Propo-
sition 38.50  Moreover, these figures do not present the full picture, but are 
drawn from campaign finance reports that fail to include resources—public tax 
dollars—spent by voucher opponents.  The Michigan Department of State’s 
Compliance and Rules Division initially determined such spending violated its 
state’s campaign finance act, but a subsequent Ingham County court decision 
stripped the Department of State’s determination of any legal significance.51  
The evidence relied on by the Compliance and Rules Division showed without 
a doubt that public tax dollars and public school resources were used as a sec-
ond arm of the anti-voucher coalition.52  The Department of State’s Compliance 
and Rules Division wrote to one offending school district: 
The Department wishes to be absolutely clear in its position regarding the enforce-
ment of Section 57: it is up to the people, and not public bodies, to decide elections.  
Even if a school district or its employees believe a candidate or ballot question is not 
in their best interest, they may not utilize public resources to oppose the candidate or 
ballot question.  Public body employees must use their own time and own resources to 
create and fund ballot question and candidate committees to engage in the political 
process.53 
 
 47. Public schools currently have both a high level of political and populist support, thus the argu-
ment by voucher opponents that vouchers drain money from public schools resonates particularly well. 
 48. Id. at 12.  This, of course, fails to distinguish between the history of the federal Blaine Amend-
ment and the individual state amendments.  Moreover, this only highlights the multiplicity of complex 
factors behind Blaine amendments.  Michigan’s amendment, for example, is a quite recent addition to 
the state constitution and cannot be said to share the same “nefarious history” as states that adopted 
similar amendments shortly after the defeat of the federal Blaine Amendment. 
 49. See Allen G. Breed, Race Redivides Schools as Courts End Busing, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2002, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/813630/posts (noting both that the most seg-
regated schools are in the North and that “it’s not avowed Southern segregationists who are leading the 
court fights for neighborhood schools, but affluent transplants who have settled in the region’s fast-
growing suburbs”). 
 50. Jessica Sandham, Voters Deliver Verdict on Host of State Ballot Questions, EDUC. WK., Nov. 8, 
2000, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=10web_ballot.h20. 
 51. Mark Hornbeck, Judge Clears School Districts, DET. NEWS, Oct. 6, 2000, at 1C. 
 52. There were at least 29 complaints filed against public school districts for using public resources 
to oppose Proposal 1.  Spreadsheet of Complaints Filed for Violations of Section 57 of Michigan Cam-
paign Finance Act by Public School Districts During 2000 Campaign Cycle, faxed from David E. Mur-
ley, Michigan Dep’t of State Compliance and Rules Division to author (Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with au-
thor). 
 53. Letter from David E. Murley, Michigan Dep’t of State Compliance and Rules Division, to 
James Redmond, Superintendent, Oakland Intermediate School District 8 (July 24, 2000) (on file with 
author). 
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In reaching its conclusions, the prosecutorial arm of Michigan’s Department 
of State based its determination on a partially factual, argumentative, and 
speculative PowerPoint presentation and on e-mails sent out to the district’s 
network suggesting the district organize an anti-voucher training session for 
teachers, union officials, and parent groups.54  Voucher proponents simply can-
not overcome these entrenched obstacles even if a more simplified proposal 
were presented to the electorate. 
3. Federal constitutional challenges  
The final strategy suggested by those that hope to establish tuition voucher 
programs is to challenge the state amendments on U.S. constitutional grounds.  
They suggest that the “Blaine Amendments are vulnerable to challenge under 
the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause, both because of their 
discrimination against religious families and because of their sordid past.”55  
This strategy has been promoted by these advocates in the media, presumably 
because one Supreme Court ruling could theoretically strike down all state 
amendments more quickly and more effectively than individual challenges 
could.  Notwithstanding its potential efficacy, voucher advocates must question 
whether this truly is an effective strategy or merely a waste of resources. 
In April 2001, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty filed a brief in Wash-
ington challenging Article IX, Section 4 of the Washington state constitution56 
as unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.57  In line with strategic frameworks em-
ployed by voucher proponents who make challenges on these grounds, the 
Becket Fund argues that these state constitutional provisions fail the neutrality 
test set forth by the Supreme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah.58  The Becket Fund also claims that, because the state Blaine 
amendments “explicitly treat ‘sectarian’ schools differently and worse than simi-
larly situated ‘nonsectarian’ schools,” they facially run afoul of the Free Exer-
cise Clause as defined by the Supreme Court.59  If the reviewing court dismisses 
their facial claims, the Becket Fund argues in the alternative that, based on the 
nativist history of the federal Blaine Amendment, the state provision still runs 
 
 54. Id. at 2-3. 
 55. TREENE, supra note 14, at 12. 
 56. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (“All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the pub-
lic funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence.”). 
 57. Becket Fund Brief, supra note 9, at 11-12. 
 58. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  In particular, as evidenced by the Becket Fund Brief, supra note 9, at 12, 
the proponents rely on the following standard the Supreme Court set forth for evaluating state laws 
under the Free Exercise Clause: 
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law is 
to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neu-
tral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest. 
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. 
 59. Becket Fund Brief, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
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afoul of the Free Exercise Clause because the clause protects against “covert 
suppression of particular religious beliefs.”60 
The equal protection claim is based on the belief that Article IX, Section 4 
triggers strict scrutiny “because religion, like race, is a suspect classification.”61  
Moreover, the voucher proponents claim that strict scrutiny is required “be-
cause the free exercise of religion is a fundamental right.”62  As strict scrutiny 
requires the enacting state to have a compelling interest to justify any discrimi-
nation that results, the state Blaine amendments will probably fail for want of a 
compelling interest justifying the “discrimination against religious educational 
activities.”63  Finally, if strict scrutiny does not apply in an evaluation of state 
Blaine amendments, the Becket Fund argues that the Blaine amendments still 
violate the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis scrutiny.64 
4. Problems with the federal challenges  
The problems with the federal constitutional challenges to state Blaine 
amendments are insurmountable because voucher proponents rely on unsup-
portable premises that are in irreconcilable tension with other federal provi-
sions and case law and that ultimately devalue the Free Exercise Clause. 
First, to succeed on this level would require a fairly substantial reversal of 
the trend of Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence.  Although a compre-
hensive discussion of current Free Exercise jurisprudence is beyond the scope 
of this Note, the modern trend of Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence 
does not appear to be very supportive of the voucher advocates’ positions.65  
While the Supreme Court might have stated that religion and nonreligion may 
not be treated differently and that a government must show that the regulation 
“is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least re-
strictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest,”66 it will be 
exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that the state constitutional provisions sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.  Furthermore, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has explicitly allowed states to consider the “‘far stricter’ dictates 
 
 60. Id. at 13 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534). 
 61. Id. at 15 (citing the statement in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) that 
lists “‘race, religion [and] alienage’ as suspect classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny”). 
 62. Id. (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); Fellowship Baptist Church v. 
Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 497 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. In particular, the voucher advocates cite the following passage of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
633-34 (1996): 
A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all 
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the 
most literal sense . . . . [I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically un-
popular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. 
Becket Fund Brief, supra note 9, at 16. 
 65. See generally CATHARINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE (2001) (examining current Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence). 
 66. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
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of . . . [their] state constitution[s],”67 which are not overridden by the federal Es-
tablishment Clause.  Thus, it would seem that a state’s stricter establishment 
clause—Blaine amendment—would not necessarily facially violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.  Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Locke v. 
Davey68 virtually closes the door on the Free Exercise challenges entirely.  In 
holding that Washington’s collegiate Promise Scholarship program did not have 
to be extended to devotional theology majors and thus did not violate the Free 
Exercise  Clause,69 the Court preemptively gutted Free Exercise challenges in 
the voucher context in three major respects.  First, the Court explicitly stated 
that “there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”70  The Court’s reasoning focused on 
the “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establish-
ment Clause, which allows a state to rely on its more restrictive state establish-
ment clause to prohibit activity that the federal Establishment Clause would al-
low but the Free Exercise Clause does not compel.71  This, in turn, lays the basis 
for the constitutionality of state Blaine amendments in whose history religious 
animosity is absent.  The Court addressed the constitutionality of the state 
Blaine amendment and, in doing so, dealt another blow to the voucher propo-
nents’ strategy based on Free Exercise challenges.  The Court, in briefly ad-
dressing the Blaine amendment claims advanced by the religious scholarship 
proponents, determined that the Washington constitutional provision was not a 
Blaine amendment and stated that “[n]either Davey nor amici have established 
a credible connection between the Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11, the 
relevant constitutional provision.”  Thus, “the Blaine Amendment’s history is 
simply not before us.”72  As a result, neither the history nor the text of the 
Washington constitutional amendment at issue suggested animus toward relig-
ion.73  The third way in which the Court undermined the voucher proponents’ 
Free Exercise arguments was a suggestion that a Free Exercise violation re-
quires a substantial burden to the practice of religion.  In determining that no 
Free Exercise violation existed, the Court noted that Washington’s disfavor of 
religion was of a “far milder kind” than exists where a criminal or civil sanction 
exists against the practice of religion or where individuals must “choose be-
tween their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”74  Thus, it 
seems that “de minimis” burdens on religious exercise do not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, nor, in practice, do Blaine amendments. 
 
 67. Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (instructing the Wash-
ington Supreme Court that it may consider its Blaine amendment on remand).  The Court, however, 
did not rule out the possibility that Washington’s Blaine amendment might violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.  Id. 
 68. 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626, at *5-6. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at *11. 
 71. Id. at *11-13. 
 72. Id. at *20 n.7. 
 73. Id. at *22. 
 74. Id. at *14. 
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the bigotry behind the Alabama constitutional provision was prevalent 
throughout the constitutional convention.  Moreover, evidence of anti-Catholic 
animus behind the federal Blaine amendment cannot necessarily be imputed to 
the states, for even those enacted immediately following Blaine’s amendment 
lack the same animus.82  This is not to say that the states did not harbor the ani-
mus, only that the anti-Catholic animus is not documented in legislative debate 
as the racial bigotry was in Hunter.  By re-ratifying the state constitutions, the 
religious animus that may have been contained in their original ratification may 
very well have been washed away. 
Finally, voucher proponents may be quite surprised at the results if their 
federal challenges prevail.83  If their belief that religion should be treated the 
same as nonreligion84 for federal constitutional purposes is adopted by the Su-
preme Court, the result may very well weaken the special treatment afforded 
religion and erode its protected sphere.85  For example, if the notion that relig-
ion and nonreligion must be treated equally were carried out to its fullest, there 
could be no basis for affording tax-exempt status to religious organizations 
when nonreligious organizations have no such luxury.86  Carried even further 
down this slippery slope, this notion would undermine the goals of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause because if religion were to be treated exactly the same as nonre-
ligion, religion would no longer be entitled to protection.  The consequences are 
virtually endless if this belief advanced by the voucher advocates in their briefs 
were actually adopted by the Court.87 
Yet, in the end, it is highly unlikely a reviewing court would even reach the 
merits of the voucher proponents’ federal constitutional claims, for the doctrine 
of limiting construction88 should provide reviewing courts with a tool to ease 
their way around the constitutional issues.  Courts will be more willing to con-
strue a state establishment clause narrowly than to construe it in a way that cre-
 
 82. See, e.g., Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999) (refusing to conclude that the 
anti-Catholic animus in the federal Blaine Amendment could be imputed to the Arizona state Blaine 
amendment). 
 83. For an example of a federal appeals court rejecting Establishment Clause, Equal Protection 
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Due Process Clause, and Free Speech Clause claims by parents whose 
children attended religious schools excluded from a voucher program that provided grants only to non-
religious nonpublic school students, see Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 84. Becket Fund Brief, supra note 9, at 14 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) 
(“The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion.”)). 
 85. See generally Laura S. Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 463 (2001) (arguing that the establishment of a voucher regime will ultimately under-
mine the unique role religion has in U.S. society). 
 86. Nor could there exist any religious exception from anti-discrimination laws; requirements that 
employees accommodate religious practice; and countless other examples.  Any privilege of religion in 
any way would be unconstitutional.  See id. 
 87. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994) (advocating pre-
cisely the kind of equality between the religious and the non-religious that the voucher advocates do 
not want). 
 88. As advanced by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 
(1979). 
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ates the type of constitutional conflict the voucher proponents seek.  Encour-
agement of a narrow construction by the courts is the avenue voucher propo-
nents could pursue once the state legislature adopts voucher legislation or the 
state’s citizenry adopts a voucher program through a ballot proposal.  Then 
voucher proponents can set their sights on what promises to be the more fruitful 
route—encouraging a narrow construction of the state Blaine amendments. 
D. Categorizing the State Blaine Amendments 
The generally accepted taxonomy set forth by Professor Frank R. Kemerer 
divides state constitutions into three general categories with respect to Blaine 
amendments:89 restrictive,90 permissive91 and uncertain.92  These, in turn, are di-
vided into subcategories.  This Note concerns only the most restrictive states, so 
it is necessary to recite the subdivisions only of the restrictive category.93  Within 
the restrictive category are those states that have a direct prohibition on vouch-
ers;94 prohibit direct or indirect aid to sectarian private schools;95 place a varia-
tion on the direct/indirect distinction by “prohibit[ing] expenditure of public 
monies that ‘support or benefit,’ ‘support or sustain,’ ‘support or assist,’ or ‘are 
used by or in aid of’ any sectarian school;”96 prohibit public monies from being 
spent in the support or benefit of any private school;97 allow public financial as-
sistance solely for nonsectarian private schools;98 contain provisions requiring 
 
 89. Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & 
C.R. 137, 162-79 (1998). 
 90. Kemerer lists as the “restrictive” states: Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 181-82. 
 91. The “permissive” states are: Alabama, Arizona, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia.  Id.  In light of Jackson v. 
Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), Wisconsin, which Kemerer lists as “uncertain” should be included 
in the permissive category.  Ohio, as well, should be moved from the category “uncertain” to “permis-
sive” in light of Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). 
 92. The “uncertain” states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennes-
see, and Texas.  Id.  Though the litigation pending in Vermont at the time of Kemerer’s article that 
rendered it “uncertain” has been resolved, it should remain in this category as a result of Chittenden 
Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the program would violate a 
provision in the Vermont constitution that was analogous to the federal Establishment Clause even 
though Vermont has no Blaine amendment—a holding that may have been discredited by the ruling in 
Zelman).  It is uncertain how a post-Zelman challenge would fair in Vermont.  However, we shall soon 
find out as the program has now been challenged post-Zelman.  Leonard, supra note 10. 
 93. While undoubtedly the voucher advocates will encounter obstacles in the “permissive states,” 
these states are small in number and are not the states in which they are currently launching their court 
battles. 
 94. Michigan is the only state to fall within this category.  Kemerer, supra note 89 at 162. 
 95. Florida, Georgia, Montana, New York, and Oklahoma fall within this category.  Id. at 163. 
 96. California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Wyoming compose this category.  Kemerer claims that this essentially has the effect of prohib-
iting indirect aid.  Id. at 163-64. 
 97. Hawaii and Kansas compose this category.  Id. at 164. 
 98. Only Virginia has this type of constitutional provision.  Id. 
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that public monies be spent solely on public schools;99 have a “public purpose 
doctrine;”100 and those whose courts have interpreted their constitutional provi-
sions strictly to prohibit public funds from flowing to nonpublic schools.101  In to-
tal, 
there are seventeen states where strict anti-establishment provisions in state constitu-
tions and/or the disinclination of state supreme court judges to allow state funds to 
flow directly or indirectly to sectarian educational institutions create an unfavorable 
legal climate for state voucher programs that encompass sectarian private schools.  Of 
the seventeen, nine are concentrated in the western section of the country where pub-
lic schooling has been the norm since statehood.102 
While Kemerer concludes that in these states a “constitutional amendment may 
be the only way for proponents of such programs to be successful,”103 another 
avenue may exist outside of Kemerer’s unlikely scenario—urging a narrow in-
terpretation of the state constitutional provisions, under which a narrowly tai-
lored voucher program would survive judicial scrutiny. 
III 
CHALLENGING BLAINE AMENDMENTS ON THE STATE LEVEL 
Though voucher proponents’ strategies have not emphasized adoption of a 
narrow interpretation of a state’s Blaine amendment—presumably because a 
narrow interpretation would not strike down the amendment—voucher propo-
nents admit that urging a narrow interpretation has been successful in the 
past.104  In fact, it is their only strategy that has worked thus far, as no reviewing 
court has yet struck down a state Blaine amendment, nor has any state adopted 
a constitutional amendment either adopting a voucher program or eliminating 
the Blaine language from its constitution.  If their federal challenges fail—and 
they probably will—voucher advocates will be forced to turn to narrow con-
struction arguments to establish voucher programs.  While adoption of a narrow 
interpretation by a reviewing court will not lay the foundation for voucher pro-
grams in all states, neither will success of their federal challenges.105  Urging a 
 
 99. The constitutions of California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Virginia, 
and Wyoming all contain this type of provision.  Alabama and Pennsylvania’s provisions can be over-
ridden by a two-thirds vote in each house.  Connecticut, Delaware, and Texas have similar provisions in 
their constitutions; however, only certain sources of funding are required to be spent solely on the pub-
lic schools.  Id. at 168. 
 100. Most states have such a constitutional provision that requires public monies to be spent on a 
public purpose.  While this should not prove fatal to a voucher program in most cases, there are excep-
tions to that rule.  Id. at 169 (citing Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983) (holding that a public 
purpose is not served when nonpublic schools receive funding because nonpublic schools are not open 
to everyone in the state (that is, they may have restrictive admission policies whereas the public schools 
presumably do not)). 
 101. Id. at 162-71. 
 102. Id. at 171. 
 103. Id. 
 104. TREENE, supra note 14, at 11. 
 105. Success on federal grounds based on the theory of nativism would not, for example, lead to the 
striking down of Michigan’s amendment, which was enacted in 1970 after the era of nativist, anti-
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narrow interpretation by a reviewing court is the voucher proponents’ best 
chance for success.  By reviewing a handful of the court cases in which a narrow 
interpretation was adopted, this Note will sketch a framework for future chal-
lenges that may be employed in virtually all Blaine states. 
A. Wisconsin 
Jackson v. Benson106 might be considered the first modern voucher case and 
should stand out as a model for voucher proponents to follow when they are 
faced with a similar state constitutional prohibition that might be interpreted as 
precluding a voucher regime.  Although the Wisconsin constitution did not 
erect a barrier to a voucher program as onerous as those of other states, its  
prohibitions107 are similar to those of states in which the constitutionality of a 
voucher program may be questioned.  The Wisconsin provision essentially pro-
hibited the use of public funds to support religious organizations.108  Despite this 
provision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a program that provided 
parents with a tuition voucher redeemable at a religious or nonreligious non-
public school109 violated neither the federal Constitution nor the state constitu-
tion.110 
When examining the state’s constitutional provisions, the Wisconsin su-
preme court broke down the analysis into a two-part inquiry: (1) Did the pro-
gram violate the “benefits clause”111 portion of the state constitution?; and (2) 
Did the program violate the “compelled support”112 portion of the state constitu-
tion?113  In viewing the voucher program against the benefits clause, the court 
stated that, though the provision’s wording was “‘more specific than the terser’ 
clauses of the First Amendment,” the state’s benefits clause “carries the same 
 
Catholic sentiment that fueled other states’ Blaine amendments.  MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. 8, § 2 
(amended by Proposal C on the November 1970 statewide ballot). 
 106. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). 
 107. Though the challengers of the Wisconsin or, more appropriately, the Milwaukee voucher pro-
gram claimed several state constitutional bases for striking down the program, we are most concerned 
with the provision that states: 
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience 
shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any 
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or in-
terference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to 
any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.” 
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. 
 109. For a greater description of the details of the voucher program, see Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 
607-10. 
 110. Id. at 607. 
 111. The Court indicated that the “benefits clause” read: “‘nor shall any money be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.’”  WIS. CONST. art. 
I, § 18. 
 112. The Court stated that the “compelled support clause” read: “‘nor shall any person be com-
pelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry without consent.’”  
Id. 
 113. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620. 
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import,”114 as both provisions attempt to prevent the establishment of religion 
and protect the free exercise of religion.115  Thus, the benefits clause should be 
interpreted and applied “in light of the United States Supreme Court cases in-
terpreting the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”116  Only cases 
that “cannot be fully illuminated by the light of federal jurisprudence alone . . . 
may require examination according to the dictates of the more expansive pro-
tections envisioned by our state constitution.”117  Therefore, in Wisconsin, courts 
will end their analysis when federal First Amendment jurisprudence speaks 
clearly on an issue.  As a result, any state whose establishment clause mirrors 
the federal Establishment Clause should end its analysis of a voucher program 
at Zelman, for the United States Supreme Court’s answer definitively permits 
voucher programs—so long as they are structured like Cleveland’s program. 
Yet, states with compelled support provisions may need to go a step further 
than federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence and Zelman.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court had little difficulty in maneuvering around its state- compelled 
support provision because it had previously determined that this provision pro-
hibited “the state from forcing or requiring students to attend or participate in 
religious instruction.”118  The voucher program did not violate the compelled 
support clause: 
[The program did] not require a single student to attend class at a sectarian private 
school.  A qualifying student only attends a sectarian private school under the pro-
gram if the student’s parent so chooses.  Nor does the amended MPCP [the challenged 
voucher program] force participation in religious activities . . . . The choice to partici-
pate in religious activities is also left to the students’ parents.119 
Since students were not forced by the state to engage in worship, the program 
did not violate the compelled support provision of the state constitution.  Fur-
thermore, the court addressed the argument that taxpayers were being forced to 
support places of worship.  The court reasoned that this argument was the same 
as that advanced under the benefits clause.  Thus, the court would “not inter-
pret the compelled support clause as prohibiting the same acts as those prohib-
ited by the benefits clause.  Rather we look for an interpretation of these two 
related provisions that avoids such redundancy.”120 
Thus, the Wisconsin supreme court’s interpretation of its state constitution 
can serve as a model for those attempting to establish voucher programs in 
 
 114. Id. (citing in part State ex rel. Holt v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Wis. 1975)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. n.21 (citing State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239 (1996)). 
 118. Id. at 623 (citing Holt, 225 N.W.2d at 687). 
 119. Id.  For a more in-depth discussion of this theory, which was ultimately relied upon by the Su-
preme Court in Zelman as the basis for the Cleveland program’s escaping conflict with the Establish-
ment Clause, see Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent In 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000). 
 120. Id. at 622-23.  In invalidating this argument under the benefits clause, the court determined that 
“for the benefit of” a religious institution meant that the “principal or primary effect” of the challenged 
program must be to advance religion.  The court determined that any benefit to a religious institution 
was purely incidental.  Id. at 621. 
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states with similar constitutional provisions.  If a narrow interpretation of the 
state’s Blaine amendment is used, as in this case, there is no need to reach the 
constitutionality of the state’s Blaine amendment. 
B. Ohio 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Simmons-Harris v. Goff121 serves as a 
model for encouraging a narrow interpretation when the state constitutional 
provision is stricter than that at issue in Wisconsin.122  Both the pertinent state 
constitutional provision and the reasoning used by the Ohio court strongly re-
semble the issue and the reasoning employed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  
The Ohio court stated that the state provision was “the approximate equivalent 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.”123 
Unlike the Wisconsin court in Jackson, Ohio state courts never developed a 
standard by which they would examine a statute challenged under the state es-
tablishment clause;124 thus, no precedent existed for examining a potentially of-
fending statute.  Though the court claimed that there was “no reason to con-
clude that the religion clauses of the Ohio constitution are coextensive with 
those in the United States Constitution,” it noted that they had been “discussed 
in tandem.”  The Ohio Supreme Court further claimed that it “reserve[d] the 
right to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio 
[C]onstitution,” but adopted the United States Supreme Court’s “three-part 
Lemon125 test.”126  Even though the court noted the language of the state and 
federal establishment clauses were “quite different,” it adopted the federal 
standard until it sought fit to decide otherwise.127  In doing so, the court adopted 
a narrow construction of its state constitutional provision but conveniently gave 
itself an escape hatch so that, in the future, it could diverge from Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. 
In Simmons-Harris, the Ohio Supreme Court was also confronted with an-
other provision of its state constitution that appeared to create a greater separa-
tion of church and state than was provided by the federal Establishment Clause.  
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on the theory subsequently advanced by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Zelman to get around this provision that “no religious 
sect . . . shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the 
 
 121. 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). 
 122. Though several state constitutional provisions were implicated in the Ohio voucher case, the 
first challenged provision we will examine states that “[n]o person shall be compelled to attend, erect, 
or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent; and no prefer-
ence shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights of con-
science be permitted.”  OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 123. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 211. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 126. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 211-12. 
 127. Id. at 212. 
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school funds of this state.”128  Even though this would seem to preclude even an 
indirect benefit accruing to religious schools, the Ohio court held that “no 
money flows directly from the state to a sectarian school and no money can 
reach a sectarian school based solely on its efforts or the efforts of the state.”129  
Thus, the theory of indirect aid and the individual as causative agent130 saved the 
Cleveland voucher program from running afoul of the other Ohio constitutional 
provision. 
For voucher advocates encouraging a narrow interpretation of state consti-
tutional provisions, the most important lesson to be gleaned from the Ohio Su-
preme Court’s analysis is to encourage the court to adopt an escape hatch and 
thus respect stare decisis if state court jurisprudence does not speak directly to 
the state’s establishment clause.  Though the Ohio court adopted the federal 
test in this situation, it also avoided being painted into a corner by wholeheart-
edly adopting federal jurisprudence that would bind it and its interpretation of 
its state constitution to federal court jurisprudence. 
C. Arizona 
The decision of the Arizona Supreme Court stands out among similar cases 
in which the state court was faced with interpreting its state Blaine amendment.   
The Arizona Supreme Court narrowly interpreted its state constitution, claim-
ing that its state Blaine amendment was unrelated to the federal Blaine 
amendment.131  Voucher proponents claim that, had a narrow construction not 
been available, the court might have struck down the amendment.132  In Ari-
zona, the Blaine amendment language is found in two provisions of the state 
constitution.  The first clause states, “No public money or property shall be ap-
propriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to 
the support of any religious establishment.”133  The second clause states, “No tax 
shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or 
private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.”134  While the is-
sue in Arizona was a statute that provided a tax credit for religious and nonreli-
gious schools,135 the analysis employed by the Arizona Supreme Court is rele-
vant to the voucher debate. 
 
 128. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 129. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. 
 130. I will continue to use the phrase “theory of the individual as causative agent” because it is help-
ful shorthand for the theory adopted by the Supreme Court in Zelmanthe belief that the individual or 
the market, not the state, decides where the public monies provided by the contested program shall go 
and that the voucher program is thus constitutional because the “particular religious uses or activities 
involved [are] the result of private choice.”  Underkuffler, supra note 119, at 168. 
 131. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999). 
 132. See TREENE, supra note 14, at 10 (citing Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624, for the proposition that 
“circumstantial evidence of [the Arizona constitutional provision’s] connection to the original Blaine 
Amendment undermined its validity”). 
 133. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12. 
 134. Id. at art. IX, § 10. 
 135. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 609-10. 
11_LANTTA_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  1:46 PM 
232 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:213 
Though the narrow interpretation led the court to determine that tax credits 
did not implicate the state’s Blaine amendment because a credit is not public 
money,136 the court also relied on the ability of religious institutions to claim tax-
exempt status—a clear benefit to a religious organization.137  The court went on 
to say that even if the constitutional provision was triggered by the use of public 
funds, the benefit to religious institutions based on those funds was too attenu-
ated.138 
The court’s explicit discussion of the federal Blaine amendment, however, is 
particularly important to voucher proponents.  The court stated that “[t]he 
[federal] Blaine amendment was a clear manifestation of religious bigotry, part 
of a crusade manufactured by the contemporary Protestant establishment to 
counter what was perceived as a growing ‘Catholic menace.’”139  The court went 
on to state that “[t]here is no recorded history directly linking the amendment 
with Arizona’s constitutional convention.  In our judgment, it requires significant 
speculation to discern such a connection.”140  While acknowledging the anti-
Catholic animus behind the federal Blaine amendment, the court stated that 
such animus could not be imputed to the Arizona amendment.  Thus, any con-
tention that the Arizona court considered the potential suspect validity of its 
own state’s constitutional provision based on the history of the federal Blaine 
amendment is misplaced.  The Arizona court’s ruling strongly suggests that 
state courts will be hesitant to impute the animus behind the failed federal 
Blaine amendment to their state’s Blaine amendment. 
Finally, the Arizona court held that, though the Blaine amendments of other 
states are similar in wording to its own,141 such similarity in wording does not 
mean similarity in intent.142  Thus, success or failure by voucher advocates in 
challenging one state’s constitutional provision might have little bearing on the 
courts of another state, even if the state constitutional language is identical. 
D. Illinois 
The program challenged in Illinois was also a tax credit program that was 
equally available to parents of public and nonpublic school students.143  Two 
separate cases considered the Illinois program in 2001; however, the second 
case relied almost exclusively on the reasoning given in the first.144  The plaintiffs 
 
 136. Id. at 618. 
 137. Id. at 620. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 624. 
 140. Id. (emphasis added).  Interestingly, the dissent takes a different view of the motivations be-
hind the Arizona religion clauses yet comes to the conclusion that the tax credit plan violated those 
clauses.  Id. at 633-38. 
 141. Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12, with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 142. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624-25. 
 143. For a description of the challenged statute, see Griffith v. Bower, 747 N.E.2d 423, 425-26 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001). 
 144. Id. at 426. 
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in Toney v. Bower,145 the first of the two cases, challenged the tax credit program 
under several provisions of the Illinois Constitution that prohibited any state 
appropriation for sectarian purposes.146  The primary state constitutional clause 
at issue prohibited any appropriation from any public fund to aid “any church 
or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school . . . controlled by 
any church.”147  Nonetheless, without evidence that the framers of the state con-
stitution intended to give the words broad meanings that would invalidate the 
tax credit program, the court determined that they should be construed nar-
rowly.148  As such, “public fund” and “appropriation” were construed nar-
rowly,149 similar to the manner in which the Arizona court interpreted its tax 
credit program. 
More importantly for voucher advocates, the reviewing court stated that the 
Illinois Supreme Court “has held that the restrictions in our constitution con-
cerning the establishment of religion are identical to those contained in the fed-
eral establishment clause.”150  Therefore, even though the wording of the clauses 
is substantially different, their intent is the same and their interpretations 
should be the same because “the words ‘aid,’ ‘support or sustain,’ and ‘sectarian 
purpose’ yield the same results as the United States Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the word ‘establish’ in the federal first amendment.”151  Moreover, the 
court explicitly stated that “any program that is constitutional under the estab-
lishment clause is constitutional under section 3 of article X of the Illinois Con-
stitution.”152  Even though this appears to be a “lockstep doctrine,” the court has 
provided itself with an out, writing, “the court has looked to the intent behind 
our constitution to determine if its provisions should receive a similar interpre-
tation to those given comparable federal constitutional provisions.”153  Thus, it 
appears that the Illinois court will follow the approach of the Ohio Supreme 
Courtnamely, that they will follow federal Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence until it parts ways with what the court believes was the intent behind the 
provision in question. 
 
 145. 744 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 146. The first clause states: “No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place 
of worship against his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination 
or mode of worship.” ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.  The second relevant clause states: 
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school district, or other 
public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, 
anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, 
academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by 
any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of land, 
money, or other personal property ever be made by the State, or any such public corporation, 
to any church, or for any sectarian purpose. 
Id. at art. X, § 3. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Toney, 744 N.E.2d at 357-58. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 358. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 359. 
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E. Washington 
The situation in Washington is unique because both the state’s highest 
court154 and a federal appeals court155 have interpreted the state’s Blaine 
amendment.156  Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to pass 
judgment on this state constitutional amendment, saying that it was not a Blaine 
amendment at all.157  The Washington suits are also unique in that it was not a 
voucher or tax credit for elementary or secondary education being challenged, 
but an “Educational Opportunity Grant,”158 and a “Promise Scholarship,”159 
which both provided tuition assistance for higher education.  The state supreme 
court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the aid pro-
grams—the Educational Opportunity Grant and Promise Scholarship, respec-
tively—did not violate the Washington state constitution, while the U.S. Su-
preme Court assumed that the Promise Scholarships did violate Washington’s 
state constitution. 
The Washington Supreme Court began its discussion of the Educational 
Opportunity Grant by conceding that public funds were going to support reli-
gious universities.160  The court also acknowledged that the constitutional provi-
sion at issue was “far stricter than the more generalized prohibition of the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution.”161  Moreover, in acknowledging 
that its state constitution was stricter than the federal constitution, the court 
stated that “we long ago rejected the theory that ‘indirect’ or ‘incidental’ state 
support of a sectarian school is permissible.”162  Thus, the court rejected the the-
ory of individual as causative agent—the theory relied on by the U. S. Supreme 
Court in Zelman—as a means to circumvent religion clauses of its state constitu-
tion.  Nonetheless, after reviewing the history of the state constitution, the court 
determined that, even though the phrase “all schools” would seem to encom-
pass higher education, the religion clauses of the state constitution do not apply 
to institutions of higher education.163  Thus, universities are not “schools” under 
the Washington Constitution. 
The court next addressed a second state constitutional challenge to the pro-
gram involving a state constitutional provision that aims at creating a greater 
separation of church and state than the federal Establishment Clause: “No pub-
 
 154. State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002) (holding that state higher education 
grants that flowed indirectly to religious schools did not violate state constitution because, in part, they 
were disbursed in a manner analogous to the federal G.I. Bill). 
 155. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Locke v. Davey, No. 02-1315, 2004 U.S. 
LEXIS 1626, at *10 (Feb. 25, 2004). 
 156. The relevant language states: “All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the 
public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence.”  WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4. 
 157. Locke, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626, at *20 n.7. 
 158. For a more detailed description of the program, see Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 276-78. 
 159. For a more detailed description of the Promise Scholarships, see Davey, 299 F.3d at 750. 
 160. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 279. 
 161. Id. at 280 (referring to WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 284. 
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lic money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious wor-
ship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.”164  
The Washington court determined that, since the program was not adopted 
with the “‘objective’ of aiding religious establishment,” it did not violate the 
constitutional provision at issue.165  Moreover, even after rejecting the theory of 
individual as causative agent with regard to elementary and secondary educa-
tion, the court seemingly adopted the theory with regard to higher education 
and other non-early educational contexts.166  Thus, indirect aid seems acceptable 
for higher education, just not for elementary and secondary education. 
In Davey, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to ad-
dress Washington’s section 11 of Article I, the second challenged constitutional 
provision, as it related to another type of state scholarship offered for higher 
education.167  The court determined that the policy of the state agency that dis-
tributed the scholarships “lack[ed] neutrality of its face” because it made the 
scholarships “available to all students who meet generally applicable criteria, 
except for those who choose a religious major.”168  Moreover, the court deter-
mined that since it was religion that was being facially discriminated against, the 
policy must survive strict scrutiny.169  The policy failed to do so because “Wash-
ington’s interest in avoiding conflict with its own constitutional constraint 
against applying money to religious instruction is not a compelling reason to 
withhold scholarship funds for a college education from an eligible student just 
because he personally decides to pursue a degree in theology.”170  The question 
turned on the federal Free Exercise Clause.171 
Even though “the Washington Supreme Court’s view of the Washington es-
tablishment clause is less accommodating than the United States Supreme 
Court’s view of the federal Establishment Clause,” this prohibition “is limited 
by the Free Exercise Clause of the federal constitution.”172  Since the prohibition 
of the establishment of religion is already ensured by the federal Establishment 
Clause, the state’s interest in promoting its own, stricter establishment clause 
has to be uniquely compelling so as not to trample the federal Free Exercise 
Clause.173  To interpret the Washington Constitution as the state wanted it inter-
pretedproviding a greater separation of church and state than provided by the 
federal Establishment Clause and thus providing a compelling interest for deny-
 
 164. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 165. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 285. 
 166. Id. at 285-86.  The court stated that the dissent’s reasoning went “too far” because “[u]nder 
[that logic], the State could not provide medical coupons to an eligible Department of Social and 
Health Services client if the coupons were to be used at a hospital with religious affiliations simply be-
cause the funds might be used to advance the religious goals of the hospital.”  Id. at 286. 
 167. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 758. 
 172. Id. at 758, 759. 
 173. Id. at 759. 
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ing theology majors scholarship funds—would have created a Free Exercise 
problem.174  Therefore, the court determined that the Washington establishment 
clause could not be used as a basis for denying the state scholarship to a student 
pursuing theology.175 
These two Washington cases provided false hope for voucher advocates.  
Independent of the Supreme Court’s holding in Locke v. Davey, voucher advo-
cates were misled by these two cases because their reasoning and holdings can-
not be applied to the elementary and secondary school level.  First, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court narrowly interpreted its state constitution to provide 
tuition grants to students, advancing a basis for encouraging a narrow interpre-
tation of state Blaine amendments.  Voucher proponents relying on Gallwey as 
a foundation for the legitimacy of elementary and secondary school vouchers 
are mistaken because the reliance ignores the state supreme court’s dicta that 
even indirect aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools violates the 
state’s constitution.176  The court explicitly stated that nothing in the holding al-
ters this prohibition against indirect aid to religious schools outside of higher 
education.177 
Yet, by adopting a secular purpose test for education funding programs, the 
court still seems to have paved the way for future challenges to elementary and 
secondary school aid programs.  Thus, it would seem that in education funding 
cases, the constitutionality of the program hinges on the intent of the legisla-
ture.  If the legislature had the intent of supporting sectarianism, then it would 
be unconstitutional under the state constitution.  If the legislature had a secular 
intent, then even if the legislation had the effect of supporting sectarianism, it 
would remain constitutional.  An open question is how the Washington Su-
preme Court would deal with an elementary or secondary school funding pro-
gram in the form of tax credits or vouchers that had a secular purpose but indi-
rectly aided religion.  The Gallwey court seemed to have foreseen this potential 
avenue opened to voucher proponents advocating a similarly narrow interpreta-
tion of the state’s religion clauses, however, and barred it. 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling seemed to be exactly the ruling hoped for by 
voucher advocates—interpreting the state’s Blaine amendment as providing a 
greater separation of church and state than that ensured by the federal Estab-
lishment Clause, thus creating a free exercise violation.  The federal appeals 
court suggested that because protection from the establishment of religion is al-
ready provided by the federal constitution, a stricter state establishment clause 
will be viewed under strict scrutiny to almost presumably violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause.  The suggestion is that the federal constitution has already struck 
the balance between prohibition of establishment of religion and protection of 
 
 174. Id. at 760. 
 175. Id. 
 176. State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274, 280 (Wash. 2002) (noting that the court “long ago” 
rejected the notion of indirect aid as permissible). 
 177. Id. at 284. 
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the free exercise of religion.  Unless the state courts interpret their constitu-
tional religion clauses virtually identically to the federal constitution, they will 
run afoul of one of the federal constitutional religion clauses.  It is this reason-
ing of the Ninth Circuit, which resembled some of the state voucher case rul-
ings, that seemed to present the greatest opportunity for voucher advocates 
pursuing federal challenges to state Blaine amendments. 
The Ninth Circuit ruling, however, was deceptive.  First, in Gallwey, the 
Washington Supreme Court relied on logic that allowed students to use their 
G.I. Bill at religious institutions while denying tuition grants to parents of ele-
mentary school children by drawing a line between elementary and secondary 
education, on the one hand, and higher education, on the other hand.  Second, 
the nature of the free exercise right in Davey was different from that supposedly 
trampled upon in secondary and elementary education.  In Davey, the student 
was denied a state-funded scholarship solely because of his sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs.178  The state created an entitlement in the form of a scholarship 
program that used neutral criteria to determine eligibility, but then denied the 
scholarship to some students on the basis of religion.179  Thus, in the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s opinion, Washington violated the Free Exercise Clause.180 
The same framework does not exist in the elementary and secondary school 
context.  The students’ religious beliefs are not their sole reason for being edu-
cated.  Moreover, the education of elementary and secondary school students 
does not involve the same kind of entitlement as in Davey.  Any reliance by 
voucher advocates on the higher education holding of Davey would be mis-
placed in the context of elementary and secondary education. 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Locke v. Davey seriously un-
dermines any reliance voucher advocates could place in the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion.  The Court rejected the notion relied on by voucher advocates that 
lack of facial neutrality toward religion by a state program will render it uncon-
stitutional.181  The disfavor of religion by the Washington Promise Scholarship 
program was “of a far milder kind” than when the state imposes a criminal or 
civil sanction on religious practice or when the state would require “students to 
choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”182  
Disfavor of religion may not even be present in the Promise Scholarship pro-
gram, according to the Court.183 
The opinion suggests that even if the Promise Scholarship program failed 
the first prong of Lukumi—lack of neutrality—then the state would have a 
compelling interest for disfavoring religion, at least “deal[ing] differently with 
religious education for the ministry than with education for other callings,” for 
 
 178. Davey, 299 F.3d at 751. 
 179. Id. at 754. 
 180. Id. at 759-60. 
 181. Locke, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626, at *14. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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the Court could “think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment inter-
ests come more into play.”184  There has always been tension between the relig-
ion clauses of the First Amendment but “play in the joints” exists between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, meaning that “there are 
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by 
the Free Exercise Clause.”185  Here, Washington acted within the space between 
the clauses.186 
Through its opinion, the Court dealt two substantial blows to the voucher 
cause.  First, any idea that religion and nonreligion must be treated equally187 
seems to be dismissed by the Court’s reliance on criminal or civil sanctions and 
substantial burdens to demonstrate hostility toward religion.  Treating religion 
and nonreligion differently, or a lack of facial neutrality in a state program, does 
not render the program unconstitutional absent overt hostility toward religion.188  
Second, the Court will not impute the history of the failed federal Blaine 
Amendment to similar state amendments absent a showing of a “credible con-
nection” between the two.189  Thus, even where, in the case of Washington, 
adoption of language analogous to the failed federal amendment—shortly after 
it was defeated—was forced upon the state as a precondition to statehood,190 the 
connection is too tenuous to put the Blaine Amendment’s history before the 
Court as a means of demonstrating hostility toward religion.  These two por-
tions of Locke v. Davey make voucher advocates’ success in federal courts all 
the more unlikely. 
Locke v. Davey did, however, leave litigation, and potentially success, in 
state courts as a plausible alternative to federal court litigation.  The Supreme 
Court perhaps went too far in its opinion by neglecting the possibility that 
Washington’s own interpretation of Article I, section 11 of the state constitution 
had changed since Witters v. Commission for the Blind,191 citing Witters for the 
proposition that the Washington constitution “has been authoritatively inter-
preted as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will pre-
pare students for the ministry.”192  This blanket statement fails to take Gallwey 
into account, which allowed Washington to indirectly fund religious instruction 
by the creative interpretation of Article I, section 11 that universities are not 
schools under this section of the state constitution.193  Gallwey arguably over-
 
 184. Id. at *18. 
 185. Id. at *11. 
 186. Id. at *23. 
 187. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; supra Part II.C.4. 
 188. See Locke, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626, at *14. 
 189. Id. at *20 n.7. 
 190. See supra note 39; supra Part II.B. 
 191. 771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Wash. 1989) (holding that even indirect aid to fund religious instruction in 
higher education violated the strict tenets of the state constitution). 
 192. Locke, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626, at *12. 
 193. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 284. 
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ruled Witters, making the U.S. Supreme Court’s presumptuous statement about 
the Washington constitution doubtful if not altogether incorrect. 
In the end, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey dealt 
a serious blow to voucher advocates’ hope in challenging state Blaine amend-
ments on federal grounds in at least two respects.  First, the Court’s decision 
must make the voucher advocates stop to wonder what, if any, state constitu-
tional amendment will be considered a Blaine amendment in the Court’s eyes in 
order to have the “nefarious history” of the federal Blaine Amendment attach.  
Second, free exercise challenges to strict state establishment clauses—those in 
which voucher advocates placed most faith—appear unlikely to succeed at the 
federal level.  The Court’s decision, however, does nothing to undermine at-
tempts by voucher advocates to convince their state courts that a well-crafted 
voucher program does not violate the state’s establishment clause. 
F. Getting States to Narrowly Interpret Their State Constitutional Religion 
Clauses 
The reasoning used by state courts in narrowly interpreting state Blaine 
amendments should be incorporated by voucher advocates into their arguments 
for adopting voucher programs in restrictive, permissive, and uncertain states.  
Ultimately, their best argument may be to demonstrate that these Blaine 
amendments should be interpreted as nothing more than state establishment 
clauses, identical to the federal Establishment Clause in their objectives and 
thus ultimately identical in their interpretation.  At least one convincing argu-
ment independent of individual state religion clause jurisprudence supports this 
notion. 
Historically, the federal Blaine Amendment has been used to show that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Establishment Clause.194  In 
fact, “scholars and commentators have all but agreed on the significance of the 
Blaine Amendment” in that “the near passage of federal Blaine Amendment—
with its provision applying the [F]irst [A]mendment religion clauses to the 
states—reveals that the members of the 44th Congress did not believe the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment already applied to the [F]irst [A]mendment.”195 
While this is now a moot point, this history shows that the original state 
Blaine amendments—those passed in the wake of the federal Blaine Amend-
ment’s defeat—were supposed to apply the First Amendment’s religious clause 
guarantees to the states.  Zelman should settle the voucher issue for these states 
that first enacted Blaine amendments or bar only direct aid, but this history 
does not resolve the problems presented by states whose constitutional religion 
clauses preclude the reasoning used in Zelman by prohibiting both direct and 
indirect aid to nonpublic institutions. 
 
 194. Green, supra note 18 at 38-39 (explaining that the 44th Congress did not believe that the Estab-
lishment Clause applied to the states even after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 195. Id. 
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Aside from Michigan’s absolute prohibition on vouchers,196 states that pro-
hibit indirect aid are the most restrictive.  Despite other state constitutions 
seeming to foreclose indirect avenues through strict language, they have cir-
cumvented the issues posed by explicit bans against indirect aid.197  It is unlikely 
that courts will follow the jurisprudence of the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
which simply ignored its constitutional prohibition against indirect aid to reli-
gious schools.198 
Instead, the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals of New York may 
point the way forward.  When handling the constitutionality of a textbook loan 
program in light of a constitutional provision that prohibited indirect aid to 
nonpublic institutions,199 the court reversed an earlier case200 heavily relied on for 
its direct/indirect distinction201 to hold:  “[I]t is our view that the words ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’ relate solely to the means of attaining the prohibited end of aiding 
religion as such.”202  By this logic, since the state was not attempting to indirectly 
establish religion, the textbook program was not indirect aid.  Presumably then, 
as long as the state is not attempting to indirectly establish religion through a 
voucher program, the voucher program would not run afoul of the constitu-
tional prohibition against indirect aid. 
Florida would provide an excellent opportunity to test the theory adopted 
by the New York court, as its constitution prohibits indirect aid to religious in-
stitutions.203  Although state appellate courts have held the Florida voucher pro-
gram does not run afoul of other constitutional provisions,204 a Leon County dis-
trict court has concluded the program violates the provision forbidding indirect 
 
 196. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 197. See discussion infra Part III. 
 198. Durham v. McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972).  The provision at issue in Durham “pro-
hibit[ed] the use of the ‘property or credit’ of the State, ‘directly or indirectly’ in aid of any church con-
trolled college or school.”  Id. at 412.  Another provision that only restricts direct aid ultimately re-
placed this provision.  S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
 199. The provision reads: 
Neither the State nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit or any public 
money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, 
other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in 
part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denomina-
tional tenet or doctrine is taught. 
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 200. Judd v. Bd. of Educ., 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938). 
 201. See, e.g., Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961). 
 202. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 228 N.E.2d 791, 794 (N.Y. 1967). 
 203. The provision reads: 
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the 
free exercise thereof.  Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public 
morals, peace or safety.  No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof 
shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or 
religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 204. See Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding voucher program not to 
violate a school uniformity provision of the Florida constitution). 
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aid to religious institutions.205  While the case is on appeal, voucher advocates 
have the opportunity to encourage a narrow reading of the constitutional provi-
sion—one that recognizes and permits the religious schools to receive a benefit 
incidental to the primary purpose of the legislation.  This was the understanding 
of the New York court, and it is a reasonable and potentially more successful 
tactic than trying to get the Blaine amendments struck down on federal consti-
tutional grounds. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zelman, voucher advocates have 
nearly a clean slate from which they may work in some states.  States like 
Maine206 and Vermont207 that based their denial of funds to religious schools on 
interpretations of the federal Establishment Clause are again open to challenge.  
There are but a handful of these “uncertain” states, however, in which Zelman 
reopened the debate over the constitutionality of nonpublic school funding.  
The vast majority of states were left untouched by the Supreme Court’s holding, 
aside from the public discourse and political debate arising from the decision. 
Voucher advocates have recognized both the potential in the Zelman rul-
ing—voucher opponents can no longer claim programs like Ohio’s violate the 
federal Establishment Clause—and the limited mileage the decision has pro-
vided, as state Blaine amendments loom just as large as the hurdle just cleared 
in the Supreme Court.  Voucher proponents have probably misplaced their en-
ergy and resources, thinking they will be again vindicated in the federal courts, 
with Blaine amendments, federal courts will likely not provide the sweeping vic-
tory voucher advocates seek.  In fact, Locke v. Davey208 significantly undermines 
the federal challenge on which voucher proponents had placed their greatest re-
liance—the Free Exercise Clause.  The federal claims are weak and ultimately 
may do more toward undermining the religious freedom voucher advocates 
seek.  Victory requires a different tactic, a tactic that will protect religious lib-
erty both by not relying on a ruling declaring that religion and nonreligion must 
be treated equally and by providing greater choice for parents whose children 
are in failing school districts.  That tactic is litigation in the state courts. 
While the state Blaine amendments vary in their language and in the poten-
tial obstacles they place in the way of a voucher regime, the strategy of encour-
aging a narrow interpretation of state constitutions presents the greatest poten-
tial for overcoming the barriers posed by the restrictive constitutional 
provisions.  Encouraging a narrow interpretation appears to overcome barriers 
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the First Circuit, which reached a similar conclusion.  Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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to all Blaine amendments except for direct prohibitions against vouchers.  Most 
importantly, it is consistent with the history of the early state Blaine amend-
ments—provisions to incorporate the federal Establishment Clause in the state 
constitutions. 
In the end, the state courts are not likely to be a panacea, but they are a far 
more promising arena for success than the federal courts are.  There will be no 
sweeping victory.  Some state courts will follow narrow interpretations, allowing 
voucher regimes to be created in their states, while other state courts will rely 
on the strict language of their state constitutions as prohibiting voucher re-
gimes.  Of course, this presupposes that a voucher program is passed by the 
state legislature or by constitutional amendment.  If lessons are to be taken 
from Michigan and California in 2000, the state legislatures will be the source of 
any new voucher programs.  Only by state legislatures’ creating voucher pro-
grams will public opinion change.  Those states whose courts adopted narrow 
interpretations will reap the benefits, if any, of increased choices in education.  
The states whose courts followed a different path would then be left behind in 
educational progress, thus influencing the populace to support a constitutional 
amendment.  Ultimately, the coming educational reform battle will likely prove 
to be much more of a political question to be resolved in the mind of the public 
than a legal question to be resolved in the courts.  But where voucher programs 
are passed and challenged, state courts provide a much more plausible arena for 
success than federal courts and federal constitutional challenges. 
